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INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in
1925,1 the event marked the culmination of a revolutionary shift in
the legal treatment of arbitration in the United States. The FAA was a
concrete expression of the new federal policy favoring arbitration, a
policy that has since come to be cited in almost every arbitration-re-
lated case in the federal courts. However, although courts make fre-
quent reference to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration that
is articulated in the FAA, the contours of this policy are often quite
unclear. Beyond Congress's express purpose of making arbitration
agreements enforceable by their terms,2 in many contexts the federal
policy concerning arbitration seems to lack a concrete form.
As arbitration becomes an increasingly utilized alternative forum
for the resolution of disputes, 3 the contours of arbitration law are
challenged more frequently. Thus, it is important to give concrete
I United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2000) (commonly referred to as the Federal Arbitration
Act)).
2 See 9 U.S.C. § 2.
3 See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 4-5 (2000). Professor Stone provides the following statistical evidence of the
growing use of arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR):
The use of ADR has . . . grown dramatically in the private domain. The
American Arbitration Association had 92,000 arbitration requests filed in
1998, an increase of 21% over those filed in 1994. The Center for Public
Resources, an organization formed by the general counsels of 500 major
corporations and law firms to promote the use of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, obtained pledges from 4000 corporations to explore ADR options
before resorting to litigation. JAMS, a for-profit ADR provider that utilizes
primarily retiredjudges to hear arbitration cases, has offices in 30 cities and
handled over 20,000 cases in 1996. The use of industry-specific arbitration
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form to the policies underlying the FAA. When disputes arise that
resist easy application of the law, a well-articulated policy can give
force and meaning to otherwise ambiguous legislative mandates. It is
essential that courts preserve the FAA's underlying goals even where
appropriate action is not clearly defined by the law. The fundamental
nature and purpose of arbitration must always guide and give shape to
arbitration law.
This Note attempts to elucidate this broad point by examining
the policy goals underlying the FAA and applying them to an analysis
of a hard question in the current landscape of federal arbitration law:
whether and to what extent § 7 of the FAA empowers arbitrators to
compel pre-hearing depositions and document discovery from non-
party witnesses to the arbitration proceeding. The Note argues that, in
the absence of a clearly defined statutory rule, courts and arbitrators
must resolve this question through careful consideration of the funda-
mental policy goals underlying the FAA as a body of law.
As arbitration agreements become more commonplace across a
wide range of contexts, complex disputes can arise that may require
discovery in various forms and from various sources to reach fair reso-
lution. Although arbitration is generally recognized as an expedited
form of adjudication that usually involves only limited discovery proce-
dures and little or no pre-hearing discovery,4 more extensive ex-
changes of information may be necessary in certain cases, including
discovery from persons or entities not party to the arbitration. 5 De-
systems and international arbitration systems has also expanded
dramatically.
Id. at 4. The increase in the volume of arbitration practice correlates with an expanded
breadth of the types of disputes submitted to arbitration. See, e.g., ThomasJ. Stipanowich,
Introduction to ARBITRATION Now: OPPORTUNITIES FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND IN-
VIGORATION, at ix (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999) (noting that "binding arbitration" is "a term
which comprehends an amazing variety of processes," including arbitration in the commer-
cial sector, in labor and employment disputes, and in the international sphere).
4 See, e.g., Koch Fuel Int'l Inc. v. M/V S. Star, 118 F.R.D. 318, 320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(noting that "arbitration should not generally be encumbered by protracted discovery or
other procedural mechanisms").
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Corp., No. 87 Civ. 5056, 1987 WL
17951, at *4-*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1987). As the court in Commonwealth Insurance Co.
noted:
[Flull scale discovery is not automatically available in arbitration, as it is in
litigation. Everyone knows that is so; thus the unavailability of the full pano-
ply of discovery devices, with their attendant burdens of time and expense,
may fairly be regarded as one of the bargained-for benefits (or burdens,
depending on one's subsequent point of view) of arbitration.
Nevertheless, discovery is not totally unavailable in arbitration. ...
Within the context of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 7 gives
the arbitrators, or a panel majority, a subpoena power which extends over
non-parties as well as parties, and may in appropriate circumstances compel
the production of documents and discovery.
20031
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spite the potential need for such discovery in arbitrations, the FAA is
unclear as to the scope of discovery it authorizes. While § 7 clearly
empowers arbitrators to subpoena non-parties to appear or produce
documents at an arbitration hearing,6 courts have disagreed as to
whether § 7 authorizes non-party discovery prior to the hearing.7
The discovery question cuts to the heart of the policies underly-
ing legislation that attempts to establish arbitration as a viable alterna-
tive to litigation. The scope of discovery available in a given forum
directly impacts the fundamental balance between two competing
concerns in any forum: the need for efficiency of procedure and final-
ity of result on the one hand, and pursuit of institutional compe-
tency-adequate assurances that a forum will render just results-on
the other. Part I of this Note examines the historical context sur-
rounding the enactment of the FAA and identifies two critical features
of the policies underlying the Act: (1) that arbitration strikes a unique
and delicate balance between efficiency and competency concerns,
the preservation of which is critical to the fundamental nature of arbi-
tration, and (2) that the largely procedural differences giving arbitra-
tion its unique balance give rise to an adjudicative forum that is both
substantively distinct from traditional litigation and better suited to
the resolution of certain disputes.
The fundamental assertion of this Note is that the unresolved
question of pre-hearing discovery from non-parties, like any hard
question under the regime of the FAA, must be resolved through a
careful consideration of the fundamental tension between efficiency
and competency concerns, a tension that gives arbitration its unique
identity. Arbitration law must be construed to further the strong fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, which requires that the distinct fea-
tures of the arbitral forum be preserved. This Note first argues, in.
Part II.A, that the text of the FAA does not provide a clear answer to
the discovery question, and that the legislative history provides no spe-
6 See, e.g., In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir. 2000) (acknowl-
edging "an arbitration panel's power [under the FAA] to subpoena relevant documents for
production at a hearing"); Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir.
1999) ("By its own terms, the FAA's subpoena authority is defined as the power of the
arbitration panel to compel non-parties to appear ... at the arbitration hearing.").
7 Compare, e.g., Comsat, 190 F.3d at 275 ("Nowhere does the FAA grant an arbitrator
the authority to order non-parties to appear at depositions, or the authority to demand
that non-parties provide the litigating parties with documents during prehearing discov-
ery."), with, e.g., In re Sec. Life Ins., 228 F.3d at 870-71 ("[1]mplicit in an arbitration panel's
power to subpoena relevant documents for production at a hearing is the power to order
the production of relevant documents for review by a party prior to the hearing."), and
Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241, 1242-43 (S.D. Fla.
1988) ("[T]he court finds that under the Arbitration Act, the arbitrators may order and
conduct such discovery as they find necessary .... Plaintiffs' contention that § 7 ... only




cific guidance as to the scope of arbitral discovery powers under § 7.
In Part II.B, this Note asserts that careful consideration of the balance
between efficiency and competency concerns is critical to the resolu-
tion of such hard questions. In Part II.C, this Note observes that the
cases addressing this issue have failed to address adequately the funda-
mental tension between efficiency and competency, and, thus, have
failed to forge a doctrine that preserves the distinctive qualities of the
arbitral forum. Finally, in Part II.D, this Note suggests a scheme for
resolving the discovery question in a manner that adequately accounts
for the tension between these competing concerns and furthers the
policy goals underlying the FAA. The analysis and suggested resolu-
tion of the discovery question presented in this Note are offered not
only to determine when pre-hearing arbitral discovery from non-par-
ties should be authorized, but also, more importantly, to frame the
debate surrounding any hard question of arbitration law in terms of
its impact on the policy goals underlying the FAA and arbitration in
general.
I
ARBITRATION UNDER THE FAA: HISTORY, POLICY,
AND PROCESS
A. Historical Developments, the Early Common-Law Approach,
and the Emerging Legislative Response
Arbitration has long been utilized as a method of dispute resolu-
tion that offers willing parties an alternative to litigation within the
established legal systems of state and national governments.8 For hun-
dreds of years, members of particular industries and interest groups
have used arbitration to avoid judicial resolution of disputes and to
select specially qualified decision makers. Arbitration was frequently
used in England by the medieval guilds and in early maritime transac-
tions,9 and early American settlers (such as the Puritans and Shakers)
8 Arbitration is essentially a creature of contract, arising out of the parties' agree-
ment to submit a dispute to arbitral resolution. Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 10
(1st Cir. 2000) ("At bottom, arbitration remains 'simply a matter of contract between the
parties; it is a way to resolve the disputes-but only those disputes-that the parties have
agreed to submit to arbitration."' (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514
U.S. 938, 943 (1995))); see also Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir.
1995) (noting that 9 U.S.C. § 4 "requires that district courts enforce arbitration agree-
ments 'in accordance with the terms of the agreement"'); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centen-
nial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Arbitrators can exert no more control
over parties than that which the parties, through their agreements, granted to the arbitra-
tors."); 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 2 (1975).
9 See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982 n.5 (2d
Cir. 1942). Arbitration continues to be used frequently in maritime disputes. The FAA
makes specific provision for the application of the Act to maritime disputes, see 9 U.S.C. § 1
(2000), and the case law is replete with resolutions of such disputes, see, e.g., Deiulemar
2003]
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used arbitration and other methods of alternative dispute resolution
(ADR) to preserve their community values and avoid established legal
systems with which they did not identify."'
Before the twentieth century, many courts evinced a pronounced
hostility toward arbitration and agreements to arbitrate. As early as
the late seventeenth century, English courts made little effort to en-
force executory agreements to arbitrate, refusing to grant requests for
specific enforcement and awarding only nominal damages for breach
of those agreements.II Similarly, at common law in the United States,
agreements to arbitrate were revocable at any time prior to issuance of
an award, and the only remedy for breach of such agreements was an
action for actual damages arising from the breach. 12 Courts in the
United States were "unfriendly to executory arbitration agree-
ments."'13 The frequent justification offered was that arbitration
agreements were contrary to public policy because they "'oust[ed] the
jurisdiction"' of the courts.
14
The historical bias against arbitration in the United States shifted
in the early twentieth century, when both state and federal legislatures
began enacting statutes aimed at bringing aboutjudicial enforcement
of arbitration agreements. '5 Early in the twentieth century, lower fed-
eral courts began to take a critical view of the judicial hostility towards
arbitration, but refused to veer from established precedent in the ab-
sence of a mandate from the Supreme Court. 16 Legislatures, however,
did not cling to the established legal outlook on arbitration. New
Compagnia di Navigazione v. M/V Allegra, 198 F.3d 473 (4th Cir. 1999); Kulukundis, 126
F.2d 978; Koch Fuel, 118 F.R.D. 318.
10 See 4 Am. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 1 (1995) (citing Corinne Cooper,
Justice Without Law? A Search Through History for Contemporary Solutions, 48 ALB. L. REV. 741
(1984) (reviewing J. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw?: RESOLVING DISPUTES WITHOUT
LAwYERS (1983))). Furthermore, in the nineteenth century, marginalized religious and
ethnic groups such as Mormons, Chinese, andJews developed their own dispute resolution
systems to avoid perceived biases against them held by society at large. Id.
11 See Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 982-83. Thisjudicial hostility to arbitration agreements
may have arisen in part because of the practice among religious dissident pilgrims in Colo-
nial Anerica of avoiding colonial courts in favor of communal ADR practices. See supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
12 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 49 (1975); see Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984 ("Th[e] English atti-
tude [toward arbitration agreements] was largely taken over in the 19th century by most
courts in [the United States].").
13 Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984.
14 Id. at 983 (quoting Kill v. Hollister, 1 Wils. 129 (1746)). However, as Judge Frank
noted in Kulukundis, this claim of judicial ouster was logically indefensible in light of the
availability of damages actions for breach of such agreements and the judicial respect for
similar agreements, such as releases and covenants not to sue. See id.
15 Cf 6 CJ.S. Arbitration § 51 (1975) ("The common law power of revocation may be
modified or abrogated by statutes making statutory arbitration agreements or submissions
irrevocable, or relating to all submissions whether at common law or under the statutes."
(citations omitted)).
16 See Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 984.
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York, for example, enacted the first meaningful state arbitration stat-
ute in 1920,17 and in 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA). 18 The FAA, building on the reform efforts of the New
York statute that preceded it, announced a new federal policy with
respect to arbitration.
B. The FAA: Policy and Process
1. The Act, Its Foundations, and the Policy Favoring Arbitration
Congress's explicit purpose in enacting the FAA was to alter de-
liberately the established judicial bias against arbitration agreements
and to "overcome courts' refusals to enforce agreements to arbi-
trate." 19 The report of the House Committee reviewing the Act stated,
in part:
The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be
overturned without legislative enactment, although they have fre-
quently criticised the rule and recognized its illogical nature and
the injustice which results from it. The bill declares simply that
such agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a
procedure in the Federal courts for their enforcement.20
Congress intended that the FAA place arbitration agreements on
equal footing with other contractual agreements, and that it facilitate
enforcement of such agreements between parties.21
In addition, Congress enacted the FAA to provide an expeditious
method of dispute resolution that would alleviate the burden on the
federal court system. 22 At the time the FAA was enacted, congestion
17 Id.; see FRANCES KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 10-11 & n.4 (1948). The enact-
ment of the New York arbitration law was spawned largely from the initiative of the New
York Bar Association and the support of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New
York. KELLOR, supra, at 10-11. Among those at the forefront of this movement were the
founders of the Arbitration Society of America (which later became the American Arbitra-
tion Association), see id. at 11-14, 17, including Julius Henry Cohen, who is credited with
drafting the proposed Federal Arbitration Act, see, e.g., Arbitration of Interstate Commercial
Disputes: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R 646 Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the
Judiciary, 68th Cong. 10, 15 (1924) [hereinafter Joint Hearings] (statements of Mr. W.H.H.
Piatt, Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American
Bar Association, and Mr. Julius Henry Cohen, General Counsel, New York State Chamber
of Commerce).
18 United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). The act was
codified as Title 9 of the United States Code in 1947. See Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No.
80-282, 61 Stat. 669.
19 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995); see Kulukundis,
126 F.2d at 985; Shelly Smith, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts:
Consumer Protection and the Circumvention of theJudicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REv. 1191, 1196
(2001).
20 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
21 Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 271; Smith, supra note 19, at 1197.
22 See, e.g., O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Prof I Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742, 745-46 (11th Cir.
1988) (quoting Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (lth Cir.
2003]
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in the federal courts had developed into a considerable problem. As
the House Committee report on the FAA noted, "It is practically ap-
propriate that the action should be taken at this time when there is so
much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These
matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if ar-
bitration agreements are made valid and enforceable."2 3
Indeed, courts applying the FAA have frequently focused on its
role in promoting judicial economy by clearing court dockets and ex-
pediting resolution of disputes. For instance, in Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., the Supreme Court noted
that "Congress' clear intent [in enacting the FAA was] to move the
parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as
quickly and easily as possible." 24 And in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co., the Court made reference to the "unmis-
takably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration procedure...
be speedy and not subject to delay and obstruction in the courts. '25
The goal most clearly and forcefully announced in the Act's legis-
lative history was to create an avenue for enforcement of arbitration
agreements and, thereby, to provide through arbitration an efficient,
economical, and expedited method of dispute resolution.2 6 However,
the members of both houses of Congress also clearly intended to en-
sure that the Act provided for an arbitration system possessed of suffi-
cient institutional competency to protect the rights of the parties to
1981)); Smith, supra note 19, at 1179; cf Karon A. Sasser, Comment, Freedom to Contract for
Expanded Judicial Review in Arbitration Agreements, 31 CUMB. L. REv. 337, 342 (2001) ("By
providing extremely narrow grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards, the Federal
Arbitration Act protects the efficiency and finality that arbitration is intended to provide
parties. Without a limitation on... judicial review .... parties to an arbitration agreement
could always avoid .. .finality-. . . by appealing to the courts.").
23 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2.
24 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983). The Court also noted that the provisions of the Act empow-
ering district courts to stay litigation pending arbitration (9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000)) and to com-
pel arbitration (9 U.S.C. § 4) both provide for expedited summary proceedings with
limited factual inquiry. Id. In practical terms, district judges probably feel the strain of
overloaded court dockets more acutely than the members of the High Court, but the foun-
dation of their arguments is analogous. See Block 175 Corp. v. Fairmont Hotel Mgmt. Co.,
648 F. Supp. 450, 453-54 (D. Colo. 1986). As the court in Block 175 Corp. stated:
To prevent this strategy [of denying defendant's request to stay discovery]
from backfiring, I will put a time limit on the arbitration .... As a result of
sad experience with delay in other arbitrations, I will probably continue to
impose time limits.
The pivotal consideration is that controlled arbitration promotes
judicial economy. As my motion list grows despite my best efforts to the
contrary, I have come to see new meaning in that term. The more the
arbitrators do, the less I have to do.
Id.
25 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
26 See S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924); H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
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arbitration proceedings. The Report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary notes that early courts' hostility to arbitration may have been
based in part on concerns that arbitration "did not possess the means
to give full or proper redress" or that "arbitration tribunals could not
do justice between the parties."27 The Report further points out that
the proposed Act provided adequate safeguards for the constitutional
right to a jury trial by allowing for court proceedings to determine
whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.28 Similarly, the Report
of the House Committee on the Judiciary asserts that the procedure
set forth in the proposed Act "safeguard [ed] the rights of the parties,"
noting that the Act's provisions served to ensure that courts would not
enforce invalid or nonexistent arbitration agreements or give im-
proper awards the force ofjudicial judgments. 29 It also notes that the
Act required service of process in person, which ensured that parties
would not be unfairly compelled to arbitrate disputes in distant and
disadvantageous venues. 30
Furthermore, the House Report clearly indicates that the legisla-
ture (or at least one house thereof) was cognizant of and sensitive to
the fundamental tension in arbitration between competing concerns,
that is, between interests in enhanced efficiency, economy, and speed
on the one hand, and the need to preserve institutional competency
and just results on the other.3' The House Report asserts that the
procedural framework for court proceedings under the Act itself
served to balance and advance these competing interests. 32 The Act
protected the parties' rights by providing for judicial review of both
arbitration agreements and awards, and simultaneously preserved the
efficiency and economy of the arbitral process by following summary
motion procedure rather than protracted trial procedure, and by lim-
iting the grounds of review to issues beyond the merits of the dispute.
As the Report notes:
The procedure is very simple, following the lines of ordinary
motion procedure, reducing technicality, delay, and expense to a mini-
mum and at the same time safeguarding the rights of the parties. There is
provided a method for the summary trial of any claim that no arbi-
tration agreement ever was made, and there is also provided a hear-
ing if the defeated party contends that the award was secured by
27 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 2-3. The report concludes, however, that this hostility may
not have been supported by reason or justice. Id. at 3.
28 See id. This procedure is sufficient to protect the right to ajury trial because a party
who has agreed to arbitrate a dispute on the merits has waived that right. Thus, the court's
determination on the validity of the agreement to arbitrate is dispositive of the question of
waiver of the jury right as to the merits of the claim at issue.






fraud or other corruption or undue influence, or that some evident
mistake not affecting the merits exists in the award. If the parties to
the arbitration are willing to proceed under it, they need not resort
to the courts at all. If one party is recalcitrant he can no longer
escape his agreement, but his rights are amply protected. At the
same time the party willing to perform his contract for arbitration is
not subject to the delay and cost of litigation. Machinery is pro-
vided for the prompt determination of his claim for arbitration and
the arbitration proceeds without interference by the court. The
award may then be entered as a judgment, subject to attack by the
other party for fraud and corruption and similar undue influence,
or for palpable error in form.
33
This passage clearly evinces a sensitivity to the interplay between pro-
cedural efficiency and institutional preservation of substantive rights.
2. The Early Proponents' Arbitration Sales Pitch and Its Echoes in
the Courts
The early proponents of arbitration law reform-3 4 understood ar-
bitration as much more than an adjudicative system that abandoned
the procedural rigors of litigation to produce an expedited result.
These advocates viewed arbitration as a substantively unique mode of
dispute resolution, which was tailored specifically to apply to particu-
lar classes of conflicts. 35 Arbitration could provide specialized relief
through an impartial tribunal with a well-developed understanding of
the particular industrial or business context in which a given dispute
arose.3' 6 They also asserted that the mere existence of arbitration as
an established system would lead to an increase in the amicable reso-
lution of disputes between parties without resort to arbitration or the
courts, because arbitration systems provided greater incentives to set-
33 Id. (emphasis added). The Senate Report may also have recognized (albeit implic-
itly) arbitration's fundamental tension in its discussion of the proposed Act. See S. REP. No.
68-536, at 2-3. The Report suggests that early judicial fears of unjust arbitral results were
unfounded, citing a favorable review of the work of the Arbitration Society of America. Id.
at 3. The cited review highlights both the expedited nature of the Society's arbitration
proceedings and reports that both winning and losing parties expressed satisfaction with
the results that they obtained. The Report then notes that "[tlhe record made under the
supervision of this society shows not only the great value of voluntary arbitrations but the
practical justice in the enforced arbitration of disputes where written agreements for that
purpose have been voluntarily and solemnly entered into." Id.
34 See supra note 17.
-5 See Julius Henry Cohen, Commercial Arbitration-Its Scope and Limits, Address
Delivered at Dinner-Arbitration Educational Week 6-8 (May 17, 1923) (transcript availa-
ble in the Cornell Law Library). Cohen quoted Herbert Harley of the American Judica-
ture Society, who described commercial arbitration as "a special method of adjudication
adapted to certain modern needs, a new arm of the law," and noted that "[n]ew ways of
living and transacting business imply new machinery in the law." Id. at 7-8.
36 See Joint Hearings, supra note 17, at 27 (statement of Alexander Rose, representing
the Arbitration Society of America).
[Vol. 88:779
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tle disputes and an atmosphere more conducive to settlement.37 The
early proponents relied heavily on these points as central arguments
in their campaign for the proposed Act.
38
More recently, courts have echoed this vision of arbitration as a
unique system for resolving disputes, recognizing that, in some con-
texts, arbitration systems can provide substantive benefits in addition
to their procedural efficiencies.3 9 Most notably, in the realm of labor
arbitration, 40 the Supreme Court has recognized that arbitration is
not simply a substitute for judicial trial, but rather that the right to
recourse in an arbitral forum relates fundamentally to the substantive
rights underlying a party's cause of action. 41 The Court has also noted
37 See id. at 10-11 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt, Chairman of the Committee on Com-
merce, Trade, and Commercial Law, American Bar Association) ("[Instead of creating
controversies between those who might become litigants, [arbitration] has created a spirit
of conciliation and settlement. Men have found that if they must arbitrate at once they
proceed to carry out their contracts."). See generally KELLOR, supra note 17 (discussing the
ideological outlook of the early pro-arbitration movement); Cohen, supra note 35 (same).
38 See generally Joint Hearings, supra note 17; Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a
Subcomm. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. (1923) [hereinafter Hearing].
39 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582
(1960) ("The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience and compe-
tence to bear upon the determination of a grievance [as the parties' chosen arbitrator],
because he cannot be similarly informed.").
40 The FAA applies to labor arbitration in some circumstances and with respect to
some issues. However, much of the law of labor arbitration stems from provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act or other federal laws, see, e.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187
(2000), and as such is analytically distinct from arbitration under the FAA. Nonetheless,
arguments highlighting the unique adjudicatory features of labor arbitration apply with
much of the same force to commercial arbitration under the FAA, insofar as industries or
groups of related industries compose common communities and bodies of expertise analo-
gous to those found in the labor setting. Cf., e.g., Robert Eli Rosen, "We're All Consultants
Now": How Change in Client Organizational Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of
Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARiz. L. REV. 637, 679-80 (2002). As Rosen notes:
Until recently, each of the professional service industries thought of itself as
distinct from others, and so looked primarily to its direct peers and compet-
itors in learning how to confront key business challenges....
This pattern is rapidly changing as professional service firms realize
not only that the fundamental nature of their businesses is the same as
those in other professional industries; but also that they are facing essen-
tially the same competitive pressures, and sometimes even the same com-
petitors. Given their common foundation, each professional service
industry has a tremendous opportunity to learn from the methods of all
other professional fields. From now on the greatest innovation in profes-
sional service firms will come from that cross-pollination.
Id.
41 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1956). The Court
in Bernhardt rejected the lower court's assertion that arbitration was merely a substitute for
courtroom litigation:
The Court of Appeals ... held that, "Arbitration is merely a form of trial, to
be adopted in the action itself, in place of the trial at common law: it is like
a reference to a master, or an 'advisory trial' under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure .... "
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that arbitration systems can serve to create a sort of "industrial self
government, ' 42 an "industrial common law" based on "the practices of
the industry and the shop,' 43 and that an arbitration system allowing
"[t] he processing of even frivolous claims may have therapeutic values
of which those who are not part of the [particular] environment may
be quite unaware."
4 4
3. The Mechanics of Arbitration and Arbitral Discovery Under the
Act
The FAA, by its terms, applies to contracts concerning maritime
transactions and transactions "involving commerce," and mandates
that written arbitration agreements in such contexts "shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract. '45 The authority for
the Act is derived from Congress's power over interstate commerce
and admiralty.46 To enforce its mandate, the Act authorizes district
courts, on the motion of one of the parties, to stay proceedings in any
action on an arbitrable issue where a valid arbitration agreement
exists, 47 or to compel arbitration in any dispute over which the court
otherwise would have jurisdiction and where a valid arbitration agree-
ment exists. 48 The Act also establishes procedures for confirmation,
vacation, and modification of arbitral awards. 49 Furthermore, in ap-
We disagree with that conclusion .... For the remedy by arbitration,
whatever its merits or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of ac-
tion .... The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important
part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a
court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ulti-
mate result.
Id. (quoting Murray Oil Prods. Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d 381, 383 (2d. Cir. 1944)).
42 See Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 580.
43 Id. at 581-82.
44 United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
45 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). Section 1 of the Act establishes that its provisions do not apply
to employment contracts of "seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers
engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." Id. § 1. Although the Supreme Court has
recently determined that the § I exception applies only to employment contracts of trans-
portation workers, not employment contracts generally, see Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ad-
ams, 532 U.S. 105, 109, 114-15 (2001), lower courts continue to disagree as to the precise
contours of the exception, see, e.g., Gary Furlong, Comment, Fear and Loathing in Labor
Arbitration: How Can There Possibly Be a Full and Fair Hearing Unless the Arbitrator Can Subpoena
Evidence, 20 WILLAME T E L. REv. 535, 555 & n.145 (1984) (describing a circuit split regard-
ing the applicability of the § 1 exception to labor disputes arising under collective bargain-
ing agreements).
46 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). The
scope of the FAA's authority is coextensive with the full exercise of Congress's commerce
clause powers. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 274-77 (1995).
47 9 U.S.C. § 3.
48 Id. §4.
49 Id. §§ 9-11. The FAA allows for judicial vacation of an award only in narrow cir-
cumstances, such as fraud, arbitral bias or corruption, arbitral misconduct prejudicing the
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plying the provisions of the FAA, courts must give due consideration
to Congress's declarations that the Act is an embodiment of the "lib-
eral federal policy favoring arbitration agreements," 50 and that arbi-
tration agreements are to be enforced according to their terms.
51
Discovery in arbitration proceedings under the FAA is governed
by § 7, which empowers arbitrators to compel the appearance of wit-
nesses and the production of documents, and provides for enforce-
ment of such arbitral orders in the district courts.52 Section 7 states,
in pertinent part:
The arbitrators . . .may summon in writing any person to at-
tend before them or any of them as a witness and in a proper case to
bring with him or them any book, record, document, or paper
which may be deemed material as evidence in the case .... Said
summons . . .shall be served in the same manner as subpoenas to
appear and testify before the court; if any person or persons so sum-
moned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said summons, upon
petition the United States district court for the district in which
such arbitrators ... are sitting may compel the attendance of such
person or persons before said ... arbitrators, or punish said person
or persons for contempt in the same manner provided by law for
securing the attendance of witnesses or their punishment for neg-
lect or refusal to attend in the courts of the United States.
53
Although, by its terms, § 7 empowers arbitrators only to order appear-
ance and document production "before them" (often interpreted to
rights of a party, and abuse of arbitral power. See id. § 10. Although some courts have
entertained the concept of additional, so-called judicially established grounds for vacation,
these grounds are generally understood as, in essence, mere re-articulations of the statu-
tory grounds enumerated in § 10. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); infra note
164.
50 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
51 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 271.
52 See 9 U.S.C. § 7. Generally speaking, the parties are always free to enter into agree-
ments concerning the method and scope of discovery. See Robert E. Benson, The Power of
Arbitrators and Courts to Order Discovery in Arbitration (pt. 1), CoLo. LAW., Feb. 1996, at 55, 55.
Compulsory non-party discovery, however, is unavailable in the absence of an enabling
statute, because the contractual provisions giving force to arbitral procedures cannot cre-
ate obligations on non-parties to the contract. See id.; Seth E. Lipner, The Use and Abuse of
Subpoenas in Arbitration: A Primer on Third Party Discovery, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 2001, at
853, 838 (PLI Corporate Law & Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1264, 2001)
("[N]on-parties have not, by contract, subjected themselves to the jurisdiction of the
arbitrators ....").
53 9 U.S.C. § 7. In certain contexts (such as international and labor arbitration), arbi-
tral discovery powers and procedures are supplemented by other legislation and case law.
See, e.g., In re Technostroyexport, 853 F. Supp. 695, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (noting that 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a) (1988), which authorizes domestic enforcement of discovery rulings is-
sued by foreign tribunals, applies to foreign arbitration proceedings). But see Republic of
Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 881-83 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that
§ 1 782(a) does not apply to private international arbitrations). Where the procedural con-
tours of an arbitration are subject to external law, this Note's analysis of § 7 of the FAA may
not apply.
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mean "at the hearing") ,54 courts have generally construed the provi-
sion as granting arbitrators the power to order the parties to submit to
pre-hearing discovery as well. 55 However, the extent of an arbitrator's
pre-hearing discovery powers is facially unclear, particularly with re-
spect to discovery against non-parties.
C. An Open Question: Pre-Hearing Non-Party Discovery Under
the FAA
The true scope of arbitral discovery powers under § 7 remains an
unsettled matter in the courts. The issue does not often arise in litiga-
tion, and the few cases addressing the question to date have yielded
inconsistent results. Specifically, courts have split on the question of
whether § 7 authorizes arbitrators to order pre-hearing discovery
against non-parties to the arbitration. 56 Although at least one court
has upheld an arbitral subpoena ordering a non-party to appear at a
pre-hearing deposition, 57 most courts have held that pre-hearing non-
party depositions are beyond the scope of § 7.58 A handful of district
and circuit courts have recently addressed the issue of pre-hearing
document discovery from non-parties, but none has forged a unified
doctrine or yielded consistent results.
1. Comsat Corp. v. National Science Foundation: Refusing Pre-
Hearing Discovery Against Non-Parties
In Comsat Corp. v. National Science Foundation, the Fourth Circuit
held that the FAA's discovery provision does not grant arbitrators the
power to order pre-hearing depositions or document discovery against
non-parties absent a showing of "special need" by the party seeking
discovery. 59 Rather, § 7 empowers arbitrators to compel appearance
54 See infra notes 60, 67 and accompanying text.
55 See, e.g., Brazell v. Am. Color Graphics, Inc., No. M-82 AGS, 2000 WL 364997, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. April 7, 2000).
56 See NBC v. Bear Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting that "open
questions remain as to whether § 7 may be invoked as authority for compelling pre-hearing
depositions and pre-hearing document discovery, especially where such evidence is sought
from non-parties"); Benson, supra note 52, at 56 & 60 nn.13-14.
57 See Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Del. County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 880, 883
(N.D. 111. 1995) ("[T]he court... concludes that the arbitrator's subpoena [ordering the
pre-hearing deposition of a non-party] is both valid and enforceable."). The issue in
Amgen did not involve the arbitrator's authority to compel non-parties to appear at pre-
hearing depositions, but rather concerned the territorial limits on the enforcement of arbi-
tral subpoenas. See id. at 880. Amgen highlights an inconsistency in the law regarding the
territorial scope of arbitral subpoena power and the territorial authority of the district
courts charged with enforcing arbitral subpoenas. In any event, Amgen raises issues beyond
the scope of this Note.
58 See, e.g., Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275-76 (4th Cir. 1999);
Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
59 See Comsat, 190 F.3d at 275-78.
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and production of documents only at the hearing itself.60 Comsat was
a dispute arising out of a contract to construct a radio telescope.
61
Comsat's predecessor corporation contracted to build the telescope
for Associated Universities, Inc. (AUI), a not-for-profit corporation re-
ceiving funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF).62
Comsat eventually incurred $29 million in costs over the initial esti-
mate, and a dispute arose between Comsat and AUI regarding liability
for cost overruns. 63 At arbitration, Comsat sought depositions and
document production from a non-party, the NSF, to support its allega-
tion that certain acts and omissions by AUI and changes in the tele-
scope's specifications made after the contract was entered into were
the cause of the increased costs. 64 The arbitrator issued subpoenas
against the NSF, and, when the NSF refused to comply, Comsat sought
and obtained from a district court an order compelling discovery.
65
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 66 Reading § 7 narrowly,
the court held that, by its terms, the FAA does not authorize pre-hear-
ing discovery against non-parties, and that arbitrators can order non-
parties to appear and present testimony or produce documents only
at the arbitration hearing itself.67 The court reasoned that arbitration
is a creature of limited procedural rigor, in which the parties agree to
forego certain procedural rights, such as formal discovery, in ex-
change for "a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of their dis-
putes. ' 68 Thus, neither Comsat nor AUI (the parties to the arbitration
agreement) could "reasonably expect to obtain full-blown discovery
from [each] other or from third parties." 69 The court found that "a
limited discovery process" was fundamental to ensuring that arbitra-
tion maintained its efficiency advantages over courtroom litigation,
70
and concluded that pre-hearing discovery against non-parties should
not be compelled absent a showing of "special need or hardship" by
the party seeking such discovery. 71 Although the court did not define
the contours of the "special need" exception, it did recognize that, in
some cases, refusal to compel such discovery would act to frustrate the
60 See id. at 275-76.
61 Id. at 272.
62 Id. at 271-72.
63 Id. at 272.
64 See id. at 272-73.
65 Id. at 273-74.
66 Id. at 278.
67 See id. at 275. The court construed narrowly the language of § 7 authorizing arbi-
trators to summon witnesses "to attend before them or any of them," reading it as authoriz-
ing arbitral subpoenas only for attendance at the hearing. See id.






"much-lauded efficiency" of arbitration, and thus would justify en-
forcement. 72 The court held, however, that such circumstances did
not obtain in the case at bar, because Comsat was attempting to use
arbitral subpoenas to avoid the expense of an alternate avenue of ac-
cess to the information sought.
73
2. In re Security Life Insurance Co. of America and Integrity
Insurance Co. v. American Centennial Insurance Co.:
Compelling Pre-Hearing Document Discovery Against
Non-Parties, Refusing Pre-Hearing Depositions
One year after the Comsat decision, the Eighth Circuit held in In
re Security Life Insurance Co. of America that arbitrators can compel pre-
hearing document production from non-parties. 74 The dispute in Se-
curity Life Insurance arose out of a reinsurance contract, which was
managed by Duncanson & Holt, Inc., and entered into by Security
Life Insurance Co. of America (Security) and a group of seven major
insurers. 75 Security entered into this contract to enable it to sell a new
group health insurance product that it had developed, but could not
sell without a reinsurance contract.76 Under the contract, the reinsur-
ers collectively agreed to assume a percentage of Security's liabilities
and certain costs Security incurred in administering the group plan.
77
After Duncanson & Holt and the reinsurers refused to acknowledge
liability for their share of certain verdicts and costs incurred by Secur-
ity, Security brought an arbitration action against Duncanson & Holt
to recover those amounts under the contract. 78 Duncanson & Holt
submitted to the arbitration, but Transamerica, one of Security's rein-
surers under the contract, refused to respond to a subpoena duces te-
cum issued by the arbitrator, claiming it was not a party to the
arbitration. 79 Security petitioned the district court for the District of
Minnesota to compel Transamerica to comply with the subpoena or
72 Id.
73 See id. The court noted that, at a minimum, the special need exception required a
party seeking discovery to show that the information sought is otherwise unavailable. Id.
In Conal, the documents sought from the NSF were accessible to Comsat by way of a
Freedom of Information Act (FOA) request, which the NSF originally honored until Com-
sat failed to pay the required photocopying charges, id. at 272 & n.4, and Comsat never
explained why information it would obtain from depositions of NSF officers was otherwise
unavailable from AUI. Id. at 276-77.
74 228 F.3d 865, 870-71 (8th Cir. 2000).
75 Id. at 867.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 867-68.
79 Id. at 868.
[Vol. 88:779
2003] DISCOVERING POLICY
participate in the arbitration.8 0 The district court took steps to en-
force the subpoena.
81
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's deci-
sion. Although the court noted that § 7 does not explicitly authorize
arbitrators to compel pre-hearing document inspection, it nonethe-
less held that implicit in the arbitrator's power to subpoena relevant
documents for production at the hearing is the power to subpoena
such documents for review by a party prior to the hearing.8 2 The
court asserted that "[a]lthough the efficient resolution of disputes
through arbitration necessarily entails a limited discovery process, we
believe this interest in efficiency is furthered by permitting a party to
review and digest relevant documentary evidence prior to the arbitra-
tion hearing."83 The court further noted that enforcement of the sub-
poena was proper regardless of whether the court later deemed
Transamerica to be a party to the arbitration-another disputed issue
in the case-because Transamerica was a party to the underlying con-
tract and, thus, integrally related to the underlying dispute. 4 The
court also rejected Transamerica's argument that the language of § 7
authorizing document production "in a proper case"8 5 required the
district court to conduct an independent assessment of the materiality
80 Id.
81 See id. at 868-69. Enforcement of the subpoena raised a complex issue with respect
to the territorial limits of both the arbitrator's and the district court's subpoena powers.
Although the arbitrator's subpoena was deemed valid under the FAA, Transamerica was
seated in Los Angeles, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Minnesota district court in
whose jurisdiction the arbitration was to be conducted. See id. at 869 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 7
(2000) (authorizing the district court for the district in which the arbitrators are sitting to
enforce arbitral subpoenas) and FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b) (2) (imposing territorial limits on
effective service of judicial subpoenas)). The district court resolved the problem by di-
recting Security's attorneys, as officers of the court, to file a subpoena in the district where
Transamerica was seated, on behalf of the Minnesota court. Id. On appeal, the Eighth
Circuit declined to address this issue with respect to the depositions sought because Tran-
samerica had rendered the issue moot by complying with another subpoena, see id. at
869-70, 872, but upheld the district court with respect to the document discovery, id. at
872. The Eighth Circuit held that the territorial limits of FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b) (2) did not
apply to document discovery under § 7 because "the burden of producing documents
need not increase appreciably with an increase in the distance those documents must
travel." Id. For a more thorough discussion of this conundrum and the solution advanced,
see Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Center of Delaware County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Il. 1995).
The territorial enforcement issue raised in these cases is beyond the scope of this Note.
82 Sec. Life Ins., 228 F.3d at 870-71.
83 Id. at 870. The court did not address the issue of whether the arbitrators were
empowered to compel pre-hearing depositions from non-parties because the question had
been rendered moot in the case at bar. See id. The witnesses had already submitted to
depositions under force of another subpoena. Id.
84 Id. at 871 (citing Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42 (M.D.
Tenn. 1994)). Meadows Indemnity Co. held that a non-party who is intricately related to the
parties involved in the arbitration can be required under § 7 to produce documents prior
to the hearing. See 157 F.R.D. at 45.
85 9 U.S.C. § 7.
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of the discovery sought, and found that independent judicial review of
the merits of an arbitral discovery order "is antithetical to the well-
recognized federal policy favoring arbitration, and compromises the
panel's presumed expertise in the matter at hand.
8 6
A 1995 case from the Southern District of New York, Integrity In-
surance Co. v. American Centennial Insurance Co., implicitly reached the
same result as Security Life Insurance regarding document discovery,
holding that pre-hearing depositions against non-parties were not
within the scope of § 7.87 Integrity Insurance involved a petition to
quash arbitral subpoenas ordering former officers of Integrity Insur-
ance Co. to appear at depositions and produce documents. 8  The
court reasoned that the subpoenas were unenforceable as to the depo-
sitions for two reasons: (1) although arbitral power over parties de-
rives from both the FAA and the arbitration agreement, power over
non-parties derives solely from the FAA, which authorizes only appear-
ances before the arbitrators;8 9 and (2) the increased burden of com-
pelling depositions, as opposed to document production, should not
be imposed on non-parties.90
II
WHAT POLICY DiscovERs: THE SCOPE OF ARBITRAL
SUBPOENA POWER
A. Textual Analysis Cannot Resolve the Question of Pre-Hearing
Discovery Against Non-Parties
Much of the reasoning supporting the case law on the question of
pre-hearing non-party discovery rests on textual analysis of § 7 itself.
Textual analysis, however, cannot provide an adequate answer be-
cause the text of § 7 is inherently ambiguous; its express language ei-
ther yields internally inconsistent constructions of the scope of
authorized arbitral discovery91 or produces absurd results. 92 Further-
more, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the FAA, as
well as the contemporaneous writings of the early proponents of fed-
eral arbitration legislation, provide little or no context for resolving
the discovery question. It is clear that the drafters and advocates of
86 Sec. Life Ins., 228 F.3d at 871.
87 885 F. Supp. 69, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Integrity Insurance held that arbitrators could
not compel pre-hearing non-party depositions, and ordered that subpoenas issued by the
arbitrator be modified in accordance with that holding. Id. The subpoenas called for both
depositions and document production. Id. at 70.
88 Id. at 70.
89 Id. at 71-72.
90 Id. at 73.
91 The internal inconsistency of § 7 is illustrated by the lack of consistency in courts'
constructions of the provision. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
92 See infra Part Il.A.I.
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the proposed Act, as well as the congressional committees that held
hearings on it, were not directly concerned with the precise contours
of the scope of § 7. Because neither the text nor the history of the
FAA offers a clear picture of the scope of § 7, it becomes necessary to
acknowledge the failure of textual analysis and turn instead to an ex-
amination of underlying policies.
93
1. The Text of the Provision Is Facially Ambiguous
On its face, the grant of arbitral discovery power in § 7 is ambigu-
ous because the scope of that power is not clearly defined in the provi-
sion itself. Thus, strict textual analysis cannot answer the question at
hand because § 7 does not state whether arbitrators have the power to
order pre-hearing discovery against non-parties. 94 The critical lan-
guage of § 7 that gives rise to the provision's inherent ambiguity is the
following:
The arbitrators .... or a majority of them, may summon in writing
any person to attend before them or any of them as a witness and in
a proper case to bring with him or them any book, record, docu-
ment, or paper which may be deemed material as evidence in the
case.95
The ambiguity arises largely from the phrase "to attend before
them or any of them," which some courts have read to exclude pre-
hearing discovery.96 Although the "attend before them" language can
be read to place limits on the scope of arbitral subpoena power, a fair
reading of the entire provision does not warrant the conclusion that
all pre-hearing discovery against non-parties is specifically excluded by
the terms of § 7. Such a reading would produce either internal literal
inconsistency or absurd results. Even assuming that the "attend
before them" language does limit arbitral subpoena power, the con-
tours of that limitation are not clearly identifiable.
An example from the case law highlights the problems with a lit-
eral reading of § 7. In Comsat Corp. v. National Science Foundation, the
Fourth Circuit held that arbitral subpoena power under § 7 does not
include the power to compel pre-hearing discovery from non-par-
ties.97 The court reasoned that "[b]y its own terms, the FAA's sub-
poena authority is defined as the power of the arbitration panel to
compel non-parties to appear 'before them;' that is, to compel testimony
93 Cf, e.g., United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[Wie
will look beyond the express language of a statute only where that statutory language is
ambiguous or where a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result or thwart the
purpose of the overall statutory scheme.").
94 See9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
95 Id.
96 See, e.g., Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999).
97 See id. at 275-76; supra Part I.C.1.
2003]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
by non-parties at the arbitration hearing."98 The Comsat court thus read
the "attend before them" language to mean before them at the hearing.9 9
Therefore, because § 7 empowers discovery only to be compelled at
the hearing, pre-hearing discovery is beyond the scope of the arbitra-
tor's authority under § 7.lo °
There are two problems with the "literal" reading advanced by
the Comsat court. First, the reading is misleading and internally incon-
sistent because it is only selectively literal. The "attend before them"
language in its complete form reads "attend before them or any of
them." 10 1 This language, when read in its totality, implicates a scope of
contexts broader than just the arbitration hearing itself. In particular,
the "or any of them" language suggests that the rule contemplates ap-
pearances other than those at the hearing itself because, presumably,
all of the arbitrators would be present at the hearing. Furthermore,
arbitrator-supervised depositions or discovery conferences involving
arbitral review of document discovery would seem to fall within the
literal language of § 7.102 However, this more expansive reading of
§ 7 is itself problematic because it does not define a clear and worka-
ble outer boundary to arbitral discovery powers. ' 0 3 The ambiguity re-
sulting from this "literal" interpretation of § 7 suggests that the
analysis of arbitral discovery powers under § 7 should not be driven
solely by a literal reading.'
4
Second, a literal reading such as that advanced by the Comsat
court is problematic in that it would lead to absurd results. The literal
language of § 7 authorizes arbitrators to order any person to "attend
before them or any of them" and, where proper, to order such per-
sons "to bring with him or them" any document discovery the arbitrators
deem appropriate. 0 5 Read literally, § 7 produces an absurd result be-
cause it would require all document discovery to be produced inciden-
tally to the in-person appearance of a witness. Documents could not
be produced for discovery purposes if the person producing those
documents did not appear before an arbitrator. Such a result is pa-
98 Comsat, 190 F.3d at 275 (emphasis added).
99 See id.
100 Of course, the arbitrator may have the power to compel pre-hearing discovery from
the parties by virtue of other sources of authority, such as the arbitration agreement itself.
See, e.g., Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
101 9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000) (emphasis added).
102 Admittedly, such arbitrator-supervised discovery proceedings are not common
practice. However, the expansion of arbitration into a widening range of dispute contexts
has also expanded the range of procedural devices necessary and available to the just reso-
lution of those disputes. Although these practices may not be the norm, they certainly are
foreseeable.
103 To say that the language of § 7 contemplates discovery in contexts other than the
hearing itself is not to say that those contexts are clearly defined.
104 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
105 9 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added).
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tently absurd in light of the discovery practices available in traditional
litigation and the clear congressional intent to further arbitration as a
more expedient alternative to litigation. In virtually every court sys-
tem in the United States, litigants are afforded a discovery device ena-
bling direct requests for the production of documents by other
persons.' 0 6 An in-person appearance requirement imposed on every
arbitral document request would greatly increase the expense and
burden on all persons involved and would inject significant delay and
inefficiency into the arbitration process. 10 7 Indeed, both the burden
and delay would exceed those imposed in traditional litigation. Be-
cause Congress intended the FAA to promote arbitration as a speedy,
efficient, and cost-effective alternative to traditional litigation, 08 it is
implausible to suggest that Congress would impose such a require-
ment on arbitral discovery procedures.' 0 9
The absurd result that such a literal reading of § 7 would produce
clearly counsels against applying literal, textual analysis in determin-
ing the scope of arbitral subpoena powers under § 7. Courts have
106 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (authorizing requests for production of documents from
opposing parties); FED. R. Civ. P. 45(a) (1) (C) (authorizing, inter alia, subpoenas for pro-
duction of documents from non-parties).
107 See Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (M.D. Tenn.
1994). As the court noted:
There is little dispute [that] the arbitration panel, pursuant to its authority
under Section 7, could require a witness... to appear before the panel and
bring all of the documents at issue to a hearing. Considering the sheer
number of documents addressed by the subpoena, however, this scenario
seems quite fantastic and practically unreasonable. With this in mind, the
arbitration panel issued the disputed subpoena as a method of dealing with
complex and voluminous discovery matters in an orderly and efficient
manner.
Id.
108 See, e.g., id. at 45 ("(T]he underlying policies behind arbitration include the resolu-
tion of issues in an efficient and less costly manner .. "); supra notes 24-27 and accompa-
nying text (discussing evidence of the congressional concern for efficiency interests in
arbitration). The policy concerns for efficiency and economy (as well as the concerns for
competency) were clearly expressed in a brief that was incorporated into the record at the
congressional hearings on the proposed Arbitration Act:
The evils at which arbitration agreements in general are directed are three
in number. (1) The long delay usually incident to a proceeding at law, in
equity or in admiralty .... (2) The expense of litigation. (3) The failure,
through litigation, to reach a decision regarded as just when measured by
the standards of the business world.
Joint Hearings, supra note 17, at 34-35 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen).
109 This argument holds true even assuming, arguendo, that Congress intended § 7 to
grant arbitrators the power to compel attendance and production only at the hearing (i.e.,
that Congress intended no pre-hearing discovery). Putting aside problems of authentica-
tion, see, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 901-903, and the so-called Best Evidence Rule, see, e.g., FED. R.
EvID. 1001-1008, there is no requirement that documents be produced at trial in conjunc-
tion with an in-person appearance of the party producing such documents. Thus, even if
discovery under § 7 was meant to be limited to the arbitration hearing itself, a literal read-
ing of the statute would mandate a less efficient and more burdensome procedure than
that available to courtroom litigants.
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consistently recognized that statutory language should not be applied
literally if doing so would produce absurd results.110 Moreover, where
a literal reading of a statute produces odd results that conflict with
legislative intent, courts may look to external evidence to give force to
the statute."' Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that "[i]n
determining the meaning of [a] statute, we look not only to the partic-
ular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and
to its object and policy."'112 Thus, § 7 should not be read literally.
Rather, courts should look to the Act's legislative history for guidance
in interpreting § 7 in accordance with relevant policy concerns.
2. The Historical Context Does Not Support a Textual Analysis that
Yields Concrete Results
Although the legislative history provides insight into the funda-
mental policy concerns underlying Congress's enactment of the
FAA," t3 a review of that history does nothing to illuminate the legisla-
tive intent with respect to the particular contours of arbitral discovery
under § 7. In essence, the legislative history is silent on the scope and
mechanics of the discovery powers Congress intended to grant arbitra-
tors. For instance, the Senate Report recommending enactment of
the FAA notes only that "Section 7 gives the arbitrators power to sum-
mon witnesses."' 14 The corresponding House Report is silent on the
issue of discovery, noting only that "[t] he bill declares simply that...
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a proce-
dure in the Federal courts for their enforcement."' 15
Furthermore, the records of congressional hearings concerning
the proposed Act reveal at most only cursory references to the scope
of § 7 discovery powers. A brief entitled The Proposed Federal Arbitration
Statute, which was incorporated into the record of the Joint Hearing
Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary, states
that "[t]he arbitrators are given powers to call witnesses and require
the production of papers, to assure that a full and fair consideration
110 See Merritt v. Dillard Paper Co., 120 F.3d 1181, 1188 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Row-
land v. California Men's Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 200 & n.3 (1993) and United States v. Oboh,
92 F.3d 1082, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996)); Nesovic v. United States, 71 F.3d 776, 778 & n.3 (9th
Cir. 1995) (citing Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)); United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990).
I'' See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088-89 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Where
evidence shows that Congress intended something other than the literal interpretation of
the statute, that interpretation "need not rise to the level of 'absurdity' before recourse is
taken to the legislative history." Id. at 1088.
112 Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990).
113 See supra Part I.B.1.
114 S. REP. No. 68-536, at 3 (1924).
115 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924). It can be assumed that this statement in part
refers to the FAA's provision for judicial enforcement of arbitral subpoenas.
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of the controversy may be had despite the possible recalcitrance of
one or more parties to the dispute." 1 6 Moreover, the record of the
Senate, Hearing considering the proposed Act, held during the sixty-
seventh Congress (the term before the proposed Act was enacted), is
completely silent on the issue of discovery procedures.' 1 7 Because the
legislative history provides no insight into the intended scope and
mechanics of arbitral discovery under § 7, and because the text of the
statute itself is unclear on this question,1 18 it is necessary to look to the
policies underlying the FAA to give force and meaning to § 7's grant
of arbitral discovery powers.
B. Adequate Resolution of the Question Requires Careful
Consideration of Its Relation to the Fundamental
Tension in Arbitration
Part I.B.1 of this Note identified two critical policy concerns un-
derlying the FAA, namely, the concern for preserving the procedural
efficiency and economy of arbitration as compared to traditional liti-
gation, and the interest in maintaining the institutional competency
of arbitration to ensure that it renders just results. Part I.B. 1 also ar-
gued that Congress carefully designed the FAA to strike a balance be-
tween these two competing concerns. Part I.B.2 asserted that the early
proponents of federal arbitration law saw this balance as creating in
arbitration a substantively unique and independently valuable system
for resolving disputes, and that the courts have to some extent recog-
nized and adopted this view of arbitration. Part II.A showed that the
statutory text and legislative history cannot establish the contours of
non-party subpoena powers under § 7. This subpart asserts that the
question of pre-hearing discovery against non-parties must be an-
swered through a careful consideration of the effect a proposed rule
would have on the fundamental tension between efficiency and com-
petency concerns. Where statutory language and legislative intent
fail, it becomes necessary to look to policy to preserve the delicate
balance between the competing concerns that defines the arbitral
process.
Although parties who choose arbitration are often looking for an
expedited resolution of their disputes, their selection of arbitration
does not signal an abandonment of the desire for just results. 1" 9 Un-
fortunately, when considering the policy implications of a given
course of action, many courts focus solely on arbitration's efficiency
116 Joint Hearings, supra note 17, at 36 (brief submitted by Julius Henry Cohen).
117 See Hearing, supra note 38.
118 See supra Part II.A.1.
119 See infra notes 132, 137-39 and accompanying text.
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and procedural streamlining.1 20 This is true largely because procedu-
ral streamlining is the most immediately ascertainable feature distin-
guishing arbitration from traditional litigation.1 2' However, as some
courts have recognized, a more thorough consideration of policy con-
cerns must account for competency interests and strike a balance be-
tween speed and accuracy of result.
In Koch Fuel International Inc. v. M/V South Star, the court recog-
nized that "arbitration should not generally be encumbered by pro-
tracted discovery or other procedural mechanisms .... However, in
deferring to the arbitration forum in accordance with the parties'
agreement, the Court should not blindfold the arbitrators and frus-
trate, perhaps irreparably, the fact-finding process . *..."122 Further-
more, the court in Meadows Indemnity Co. v. Nutmeg Insurance Co.
explicitly recognized both "that one of the ultimate goals of the arbi-
tration panel is to make a full and fair determination of the issues in-
volved,"123 and that "the underlying policies behind arbitration
include the resolution of issues in an efficient and less costly man-
ner." 124 The court then held that § 7 authorized the arbitrators to
order a non-party to produce pre-hearing document discovery. 125
The court asserted that the argument against arbitral authority to or-
der pre-hearing discovery "requires adoption of an unnecessarily con-
strictive and unreasonable reading of Section 7 which would limit the
ability of the arbitration panel to deal effectively with a large and com-
plex case such as the one at hand, and generally hamper the use of
120 See, e.g., Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999).
121 See id. On the exact question considered in this Note, the Comsat court reasoned as
follows:
The rationale for constraining an arbitrator's subpoena power is clear. Par-
ties to a private arbitration agreement forego certain procedural rights at-
tendant to formal litigation in return for a more efficient and cost-effective
resolution of their disputes.... A hallmark of arbitration-and a necessary
precursor to its efficient operation-is a limited discovery process.... Con-
sequently, because COMSAT and AUI have elected to enter arbitration,
neither may reasonably expect to obtain full-blown discovery from the
other or from third parties.
Id. (citations omitted).
122 118 F.R.D. 318, 320-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). The issue in Koch Fuel, a maritime dispute,
centered around one party's attempt to secure depositions of non-citizen witnesses who
were sure to leave the country and thus were only temporarily within the jurisdictional
reach of either the arbitrators or the court. See id. at 320. Koch Fuel was not a case involving
the application of § 7 to non-party arbitral discovery.
123 157 F.R.D. 42, 45 (M.D. Tenn. 1994) (emphasis added).
124 Id.
125 Id. ("The power of the panel to compel production of documents from third-par-
ties for the purposes of a hearing implicitly authorizes the lesser power to compel such
documents for arbitration purposes prior to a hearing.").
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arbitration as a forum for dispute resolution. '" 126 Moreover, other
courts have recognized implicitly the need to preserve this balance.
127
The failure of many courts to consider arbitral efficiency as an
element that must be balanced against competency concerns is also
problematic because parties may choose, arbitration to achieve other
systemic advantages unrelated to procedural speed. 128 Arbitration's
particular balance of these competing concerns (and other structural
elements of the arbitral forum) can create unique, substantive charac-
teristics that make arbitration better suited to the resolution of certain
classes of disputes. 129 This fact was recognized by the early propo-
nents of federal arbitration legislation, who made it a central plank in
their lobbying platform before Congress, and, more recently, by the
Supreme Court on numerous occasions. 130 An analytic focus that cen-
ters on arbitral efficiency alone threatens to undermine this potential
benefit of the arbitral forum.
One commentator, Eric Schwartz, has addressed explicitly the
fundamental relationship between efficiency and competency in the
realm of international arbitration, and has suggested that it is crucial
to maintain the balance of these interests and to consider how this
balance relates to the intentions of the parties who agree to arbitra-
tion. 31 As Schwartz notes:
In considering matters of procedure in international arbitra-
tion, the international arbitration community... has a responsibil-
126 Id. Although one could argue that Meadows Indemnity is an example of a court
properly applying the relevant policy concerns to the pre-hearing, non-party discovery
question, but see infra Part II.C (arguing that the courts addressing this question have failed
to adequately consider the relevant policy concerns), the validity of the court's analysis is
ultimately undermined by its focus on the fact that the non-parties subpoenaed, while tech-
nically not parties to the proceeding, were "intricately related to the parties involved in the
arbitration and ... not mere third-parties who have been pulled into this matter arbitrar-
ily," Meadows Indemnity, 157 F.R.D. at 45; see also infra note 152 and accompanying text
(discussing a similar flaw in another court's reasoning).
127 See, e.g., Blanchard & Co. v. Heritage Capital Corp., No. 3:97-CV-0690-H, 2000 WIl.
1281205, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2000) ("Because an arbitration proceeding is much less
formal than a trial in court, '[i] n handling all the evidence an arbitrator need not follow all
the niceties observed by the federal courts. He need only grant the parties a fundamen-
tally fair hearing."' (citation omitted)).
128 See, e.g., supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
129 See supra Part I.B.2.
130 See supra Part I.B.2.
131 See Eric A. Schwartz, Reconciling Speed with Justice in International Arbitration, in IM-
PROVING INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE NEED FOR SPEED AND TRUST 44 (Benjamin G.
Davis ed., 1998). Schwartz asserts that:
[T]he relationship between speed and justice is, of course, a necessary con-
sideration in relation to all procedures for the resolution of disputes. In-
deed, it is always necessary to consider how much speed a process can




ity to ensure that the process offers sufficient safeguards so that
justice can be done and be seen to be done and that considerations
of due process and fairness are not emasculated solely in the inter-
est of achieving greater levels of speed .... Insofar as arbitrations
can be conducted rapidly, this is obviously to be welcomed by all
those who participate in the process. But, at the same time, we must
never lose sight of the special role that arbitration plays in the inter-
national legal order, and of the need to ensure that parties ... can
feel confident that, through that process,justice can be obtained. '
32
Schwartz further asserts that speed and procedural streamlining
should not be confused with "the overall efficacy of the process" of
arbitration. 1 3 3 He points out that a result quickly rendered is not nec-
essarily a just result, and thus that a speedy arbitration proceeding
may in fact lead to a more protracted overall process for adjudicating
claims, producing a net loss in total efficacy.1 34 As Schwartz states:
A speedy arbitration will accomplish little if the award is not
respected, i.e., if it is set aside by the courts or otherwise tied up in
judicial proceedings for years thereafter. What therefore counts
more than the speed of the arbitration process itself is the time re-
quired to obtain effective relief.
1 35
Schwartz's arguments indicate that arbitration policy and practice
must be informed by careful consideration of the tension between ef-
ficiency and competency concerns. Moreover, his arguments suggest
that some courts addressing the pre-hearing discovery issue under § 7
have not given adequate consideration to competency concerns.
13 6
Although Schwartz suggests that his analysis of the tension be-
tween efficiency and competency (or, in his words, the need to
"reconcil[e] speed with justice") 137 is based on particular characteris-
tics of international-as distinguished from domestic-arbitration, his
arguments apply with equal force in the context of domestic arbitra-
tion. For example, Schwartz suggests that competency concerns are
crucial in international arbitration because the parties may choose ar-
bitration for reasons other than a desire for procedural efficiency.
1 38
Similarly, parties in the domestic sphere often choose arbitration for
reasons other than efficiency.139 Moreover, even when efficiency is
132 Id. at 45.
133 Id. at 47.
134 Id. at 47-48.
135 Id. at 47.
136 See infra Part II.C.
137 See Schwartz, supra note 131, at 44.
138 Id. at 44-45 ("In the absence of an international commercial judicial system, inter-
national arbitration ... may be the only available dispute resolution mechanism with which
all of the parties to a transaction may feel comfortable.").
139 Indeed, parties may choose arbitration to achieve the therapeutic process values
described by the Supreme Court and the early proponents of the FAA, or, in the interest of
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the parties' explicit rationale in selecting arbitration, there is no rea-
son to assume that institutional competency is a non-issue. In addi-
tion, Schwartz's assertion that a speedy award actually hurts overall
efficiency if it leads to post-award delay applies with equal force in the
domestic context.1 4 0 Thus, in both the domestic and international
spheres, sound arbitration practice necessitates a careful considera-
tion of the balance between efficiency interests and competency
concerns.
C. Case Law Fails to Address Adequately How Pre-Hearing
Discovery Against Non-Parties Relates to the
Fundamental Tension Underlying Arbitration
In addressing the issue of pre-hearing discovery against non-par-
ties, the cases discussed above1 41 fail to consider adequately the full
scope of the underlying policy concerns framing the fundamental ten-
sion between efficiency and competency interests at play in arbitra-
tion.142 These cases usually focus only on how the discovery at issue
affects the speed or economy of the proceeding and the burden on
the parties.' 43 A one-sided analysis of the discovery question cannot
produce a doctrinal result that gives force and meaning to the full
scope of policy concerns underlying the FAA. Furthermore, cases
such as Comsat rely on an overly textual analysis of § 7. As discussed
above, textual analysis cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the
question at hand.
To begin with, although the Comsat court may have reached the
right result on the facts of the case, especially in light of the alternate
source of the information sought by Comsat, the decision is doctri-
nally problematic and yields an incorrect result in terms of the rule it
establishes. By focusing solely on the efficiency goals of arbitration,
the decision completely fails to address how competency concerns im-
pact the issue at hand, and produces a rule that does not reflect a
careful and considered balance of efficiency against competency. Fur-
competency, to have their disputes settled by arbitrators with a particular expertise. See
supra Part I.B.2. Furthermore, to the extent that arbitrations arise out of comprehensive,
pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims, parties are largely in the same position as dispu-
tants in the international sphere in that they have no other alternative fora in which to
resolve their disputes. See Schwartz, supra note 131, at 45.
140 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000) (listing grounds for vacating an improper arbitral
award). The grounds for vacation of an arbitral award under the FAA include procedural
misconduct (such as denial of requests with good cause for continuance or refusal to hear
material evidence) that prejudices the rights of a party. Id. § 10(a)(3).
141 See supra Part I.C.
142 See supra Part I1.B; see alo supra Part I..1 (identifying in the legislative history of
the FAA evidence of the congressional sensitivity to both efficiency and competency
concerns).
143 See, e.g., supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
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thermore, the court's narrow reading of § 7 is not supported by the
text or the legislative history of the Act, both of which are ambiguous
with respect to the scope of arbitral discovery. Contrary to the Fourth
Circuit's reading in Comsat, 44 § 7 does not by its terms authorize sub-
poenas only for production at the hearing; in precise terms, § 7 autho-
rizes arbitrators to "summon ... any person" to appear or to produce
documents "before [the arbitrators] or any of them. 1' 4 5 Clearly, an
arbitrator-supervised deposition or discovery conference in which doc-
uments or witnesses were reviewed for potential production would
comport with the language of § 7.146 Moreover, the language refer-
ring to appearance or production before the arbitrators "or any of
them" further suggests that the rule contemplates discovery appear-
ances in contexts other than the hearing itself, which, presumably, all
of the arbitrators would attend. 147 Finally, the legislative history
reveals no thorough discussion of the intended contours of non-party
discovery under the FAA that would support this or any other rule as
to the scope of pre-hearing, non-party discovery.1
48
In addition, the reasoning supporting the Comsat court's exclu-
sionary rule and special need exception is facially flawed. The court
first asserted that the FAA does not grant arbitrators the power to
compel pre-hearing testimonial and document discovery against non-
parties. 49 The court then held that, despite this explicitly articulated
lack of arbitral power, it will enforce arbitral subpoenas ordering pre-
hearing, non-party discovery if a party can show a special need. 
1
50
However, if arbitrators lack the fundamental power to issue non-party
subpoenas for pre-hearing discovery (as the court asserts), then courts
should never compel non-parties to comply with such a subpoena, be-
cause the document is void on its face.
Although the Security Life Insurance court reached a different re-
sult, it replicated one of the critical flaws embedded in the Comsat
court's analysis. Accordingly, Security Life Insurance raises the same
problems with respect to underlying policy. The court based its deci-
sion primarily on its determination that permitting pre-hearing docu-
144 See Comsat Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999).
145 9 U.S.C. § 7.
146 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
148 See supra Part II.A.2. The committee hearings' discussions of discovery provisions
reveal only the most cursory references to the intended scope of discovery powers under
the FAA. See, e.g., Joint Hearings, supra note 17, at 33-34, 36 (brief submitted by Julius
Henry Cohen) ("The arbitrators are given powers to secure the attendance of witnesses
and to bring before them such documents as are necessary.").
14) Comsat, 190 F.3d at 275 ("Nowhere does the FAA grant an arbitrator the authority
to order non-parties to appear at depositions, or the authority to demand that non-parties
provide ... prehearing [document] discovery.").
150 See id. at 276 (citing Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 391 (4th Cir. 1980)).
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ment discovery would promote overall efficiency in the arbitration
proceeding. 51 Thus, the court failed to reconcile efficiency concerns
with competency concerns; indeed, it failed even to identify compe-
tency as a relevant concern. Furthermore, it appears that the court's
opinion may have been influenced by the fact that Transamerica,
though purportedly not a party to the arbitration, was a party to the
underlying contract, and therefore not a bystander to the litigation. 15 2
The court in Integrity Insurance, like the courts in Comsat and Secur-
ity Life Insurance, lost sight of the relevant policies underlying the FAA
and misinterpreted the law itself.' 53 The court's assertion that § 7 by
its terms authorizes only subpoenas for appearance at the hearing is
flawed for the same reasons set out in the discussion of the Comsat
case. In addition, the court seemed to reason from the proposition
that, because there is no contractual basis for the arbitrator's power
over non-parties, the extent or scope of that power must necessarily be
less than the correlative power over parties.1 54 However, § 7 does not
condition its grant of power to order discovery on any contractual au-
thorization by the party to be subpoenaed; rather, it extends the arbi-
trator's power by its terms to "any person."'155 Furthermore, the
court's burden-based analysis, while relevant, does not address either
the efficiency effects or the competency effects of the court's refusal
to enforce non-party subpoenas for pre-hearing depositions. Nor
does it account for an arbitrator's specialized understanding of the
dispute submitted for arbitration and of the discovery necessary to the
just resolution of that dispute.' 56
D. A Suggested Resolution: Let Arbitrators Resolve Internal
Issues, but Preserve Judicial Review of External Issues
The preceding sections of this Note identified the FAA's funda-
mental policy concern for preserving the delicate balance between ef-
ficiency and competency interests in arbitration, 157 and argued that
151 See In reSec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Although the
efficient resolution of disputes through arbitration necessarily entails a limited discovery
process, we believe this interest in efficiency is furthered by permitting a party to review
and digest relevant documentary evidence prior to the arbitration hearing. We thus hold
that [arbitrators can order pre-hearing document discovery].").
152 See id. at 871 ("Transamerica is not a mere bystander pulled into this matter arbi-
trarily, but is a party to the contract that is the root of the dispute, and is therefore inte-
grally related to the underlying arbitration, if not an actual party.").
153 See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
154 See Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71 (S.D.N.Y 1995).
This rationale would suggest, for instance, that arbitrators cannot compel pre-hearing dep-
ositions of non-parties because they can compel pre-hearing party depositions. Such an
argument lacks logical integrity.
55 See9 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).
156 See, e.g, infra note 180.
157 See supra Part I.B.
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the concern for this balance must inform the resolution of any hard
questions under the Act (questions for which, as here, the text of the
statute fails to provide clear answers). 158 Furthermore, this Note has
argued that the courts have failed to consider adequately these is-
sues.'15" This Subpart suggests a possible resolution of the ambiguity
surrounding the scope of § 7 that attempts to give form to the balance
of efficiency and competency concerns by appropriating the structure
of another mechanism under the FAA-judicial review of arbitral
awards. Like discovery, the scope of available review inherently re-
flects a balance of efficiency and competency because it directly im-
pacts both of these concerns.1 60 Review of arbitral awards under the
FAA divides the potential challenges to an award into two categories:
internal issues relating to the merits of an award, as to which the arbi-
trator's decision is final,161 and external issues such as fraud or other
improper bases of an award, which give courts the authority to inter-
vene. 162 This structure can apply by analogy to the question of pre-
hearing discovery under § 7.
1. The Scheme for Judicial Review of Arbitration Agreements and
Awards: The Internal/External Dichotomy
The FAA grants arbitrators final authority to resolve the internal
merits of any disputed issue that falls within the scope of a lawful arbi-
tration agreement. 63  Courts, however, have the power under the
FAA to vacate an award that is invalid or improper with respect to an
enumerated set of concerns external to the merits of the dispute.1 6 4
158 See supra Part I.A-B.
159 See supra Part II.C.
160 Review impacts efficiency insofar as it creates avenues for delay and increases the
time required to achieve final resolution of a dispute. On the other hand, it affects compe-
tency in that it provides a significant safeguard against the rendering of unjust results.
16! See9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 10 (2000).
162 See id. § 10.
163 See id. § 2 (providing that agreements to arbitrate are enforceable unless invalid
tinder contract law); id. § 10 (establishing limited grounds for vacation of arbitral awards).
Courts should not disturb an externally valid arbitral award. See, e.g., United Steelworkers
v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (explaining that, where an
arbitral decision is even arguably based on the arbitrator's contractual authority to resolve
disputes, courts should not disturb the award). Courts do, however, attempt to sidestep
this rule in some circumstances. For example, in Bruce Hardwood Floors v. UBC Southern
Council ofIndustrial Workers, 103 F.3d 449, 453 (5th Cir. 1997), the Fifth Circuit struck down
an arbitral award ordering reinstatement of a terminated employee. The case involved an
employee who was caught lying to obtain a short leave from work. Id. at 450. Her em-
ployer, Bruce Hardwood, terminated her, citing a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement that established "immoral conduct" as grounds for termination, See id. at
450-51 & n.1. The court held that the arbitrator's award was not based on his authority
under the arbitration contract, essentially by reasoning that, as a matter of law, lying is an
immoral act under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 452.
164 See9 U.S.C. § 10. Courts also recognize ajudicially established ground for vacation
when the award is manifestly contrary to the law. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436
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For instance, a court may vacate an award if the award "was procured
by corruption, fraud, or undue means,"165 if the arbitrators were
clearly biased 166 or were guilty of misconduct with respect to granting
postponement of the hearing or admitting material evidence, 167 or if
the arbitrators exceeded their powers. 16 8 In reviewing arbitral awards,
courts should apply the statutory grounds for vacation narrowly and
refuse to intrude upon the arbitrator's determinations on other
grounds. 169 In the absence of external flaws, the arbitrator's decision
on the subject matter of the dispute is final.'
70
This review scheme evinces a careful balancing of the concerns
for efficiency and competency. By starting from the assumption that
the arbitrator's decision is final, and allowing only narrowly defined
avenues to challenge an award's validity, the review structure acts to
"further the objective of arbitration, . . . to enable parties to resolve
disputes promptly and inexpensively, without resort to litigation."'
' 7 1
However, the procedure also provides an efficient and accessible
mechanism for ensuring that awards are not enforced if there is "clear
evidence of a gross impropriety." 172 Thus, the review scheme, which
authorizes courts to correct external flaws in an award but protects the
legitimate exercise of the arbitrator's decisional authority, promotes
efficient dispute resolution while providing a critical safeguard against
the danger of unjust results.
173
(1953). However, some commentators have suggested that this judicially established
ground is simply a re-articulation of § 10(d)'s bar on arbitrators exceeding their powers.
See 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REME-
DIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT § 40.1.3.2 (1994 & Supp. 1999).
165 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1).
166 See id. § 10(a)(2).
167 See id. § 10(a)(3).
168 Id. § 10(a)(4).
169 See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 164, § 40.1.4.
[T]he court's function in review is "severely limited ... being confined to
determining whether one of the grounds specified by 9 U.S.C. § 10 for vaca-
tion of an award exists."...
.. "The statute does not allow courts to roam unbridled in their over-
sight of arbitral awards, but carefully limits judicial intervention to instances
where the arbitration has been tainted in certain specific ways."
Id. (quoting Office of Supply, Gov't of Republic of Korea v. N.Y. Navigation Co., 469 F.2d
377, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1972) and Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)).
170 See id. ("However they may articulate the results, courts generally refuse to second
guess the arbitrator's determination." (citing Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich &
Co., 579 F.2d 691, 703 (2d Cir. 1978))).
171 Office of Supply, 469 F.2d at 379.
172 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 164, § 40.1.4.
173 It is important to note that other structural elements of the FAA also act to ensure
the competency of the arbitrator's decision. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 7 (authorizing arbitral
subpoenas); id. § 16 (authorizing limited appellate review ofjudicial orders issued under
the provisions of the FAA).
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2. The Non-Party Discovey Question Should Be Resolved Using an
Analogous Internal/External Distinction
The factors weighing on the question of an arbitrator's authority
to order pre-hearing discovery against a non-party in a given case simi-
larly can be broken down into internal and external concerns. Sec-
tion 7 provides that arbitral subpoenas shall be served and enforced in
the same manner as judicial subpoenas incident to federal court litiga-
tion. 174 Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides the
primary framework for enforcement of subpoenas. 75 A subpoena
must seek relevant discovery and must be sought for good cause;
176 if
it meets those requirements it should be enforced unless the material
is privileged or "the subpoenas are unreasonable, oppressive, annoy-
ing, or embarrassing."' 177 In determining the reasonableness of a sub-
poena, the court must balance "the interests served by complying with
the subpoena against the interests served by quashing it. '' 1 7 s In other
words, to decide whether a subpoena should be enforced, a court
must balance "the relevance of the discovery sought, the requesting
party's need, and the potential hardship to the party subject to the
subpoena."' 
79
In the context of the § 7 question regarding compelled, pre-hear-
ing discovery from non-parties, the question of relevance is internal to
the arbitration in that it is a function of the subject matter of the dis-
pute. That is, the relevance of a particular piece of information de-
pends on the matters at issue. 18 °1 In addition, a party's substantive
need to obtain particular information bearing on the proof of that
party's case is internal to the extent that it depends upon the issues
being adjudicated and the other forms of available proof. On the
174 See id. § 7; Amgen Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Del. County, Ltd., 879 F. Supp. 878, 881-82
(N.D. Ill. 1995).
175 FED. R. Civ. P. 45.
176 "Good cause" generally means that the discovery sought is necessary to establish an
element of the party's claim or that denial of the discovery request "would cause the mov-
ing party 'undue hardship or injustice."' See Boeing Airplane Co. v. Coggeshall, 280 F.2d
654, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (citation omitted).
177 Covey Oil Co. v. Cont'l Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993, 997 (10th Cir. 1965) (citing Boeing
Airplane Co., 280 F.2d at 659); see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), 30(b), 45(c).
178 In reDuque, 134 B.R. 679, 683 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
179 Heat & Control, Inc. v. Hester Indus., Inc., 785 F.2d 1017, 1024 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citation omitted).
180 See Meadows Indem. Co. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42, 44 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
The court in Meadows Indemnity acknowledged that the arbitrator was more capable of as-
certaining the magnitude of the internal issue of relevance:
[T]he arbitration panel has already determined that the documents to be
provided are relevant to the arbitration proceedings. Given this Court's
minimal contact with the issues involved in the litigation . . . and the arbi-
tration panel's expertise in this matter, there is no reason to second guess
the panel's determination as to relevance.
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other hand, the burden placed on the non-party subject to a sub-
poena is external; that party suffers the same hardship in being forced
to appear or produce documents, regardless of the matters at issue in
the case. Moreover, the requesting party's procedural need to obtain
the information specifically from the subpoenaed non-party is also ex-
ternal because the requesting party's ability to obtain the material
from other sources is independent of the subject matter of the dispute
being arbitrated.1
8'
This Note suggests that courts should review the validity of arbi-
tral subpoenas by allocating the decisional responsibility for internal
and external elements of the inquiry according to a scheme that ap-
proximates the allocation in the FAA's judicial review scheme.' 8 2
Courts should defer to arbitrators in determining both the relevance
of the requested discovery to the matters at issue and the requesting
party's substantive need for access to the information, but should
make an independent inquiry into both the hardship a subpoena
would impose upon the subpoenaed non-party and the requesting
party's procedural need to obtain the information from that particu-
lar non-party (that is, its inability to obtain the information from other
sources). Relevance and substantive need are both internal functions
of the matter in dispute, but the burden on the non-party under sub-
poena and the requesting party's procedural need are external. The
scheme recognizes the internal/external distinction and places re-
sponsibility for evaluating internal interests with the arbitrators. Al-
though the court would still bear the ultimate responsibility for
balancing these competing interests under the subpoena enforcement
inquiry,18 3 it would look to the arbitrator's determination of the mag-
nitude of the internal interests favoring enforcement. 18 4
This scheme would preserve the critical balance in arbitration be-
tween efficiency and competency concerns and would serve to ad-
vance the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration."18 5 The scheme
181 Thus, a requesting party's need, see supra note 179 and accompanying text, can be
divided into an internal, substantive component (i.e., whether and to what extent the re-
questing party needs the information to prove an element of its case) and an external,
procedural component (i.e., whether and to what extent the requesting party can obtain
the information from sources other than the subpoenaed non-party).
182 See supra Part II.D.1.
183 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
184 In practice, judicial deference to the arbitrator's determination of internal issues
might take the form of a legal presumption both that the information is relevant and that
the requesting party has a substantive need for the information. The subpoenaed non-
party could rebut the presumption by establishing that the arbitrator's determination was
clearly based on improper considerations. In essence, this presumption would itself ap-
proximate the FAA's standard forjudicial review of awards, which requires a showing that
the arbitrator's award clearly exceeded the proper scope of his authority. See supra notes
163-64.
185 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
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would provide considerable latitude to arbitrators to order whatever
discovery they deem appropriate, which would further both efficiency
and competency interests by providing arbitrators a mechanism for
obtaining valuable information in an appropriate case.18 6 Further-
more, the scheme would allow courts to quash arbitral subpoenas
where the burden on the party under subpoena grossly outweighed
the benefits of production or where the requesting party had reasona-
ble alternative sources from which to obtain the information
sought. 187 This procedure would serve to increase overall efficiency
by providing a safeguard against imprudently ordered, inefficient, and
unproductive arbitral discovery, and would also increase competency
by protecting the independent rights of non-party witnesses against
unjust intrusion by the arbitrators. In addition, by increasing arbitra-
tors' freedom to exercise their § 7 subpoena powers, and limiting judi-
cial intrusion on the arbitral forum to cases of gross error, the scheme
would promote the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration.188
Although this scheme would likely subject non-parties to some
additional intrusion into their affairs, the overall increase will not
likely result in significant unjust infringement of non-party rights. To
begin with, arbitrators already have the power to compel non-party
discovery at the hearing; thus, non-parties are already subject to some
degree of arbitral intrusion into their affairs. Moreover, common ar-
bitral practice and general institutional limitations on the use of arbi-
tral discovery' 89 suggest that pre-hearing discovery devices will not
frequently be employed against non-parties. And in most cases, par-
186 See In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Although the
efficient resolution of disputes through arbitration necessarily entails a limited discovery
process, we believe this interest in efficiency is furthered by permitting a party to review
and digest relevant documentary evidence prior to the arbitration hearing."); Comsat
Corp. v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[I]n a complex case.., the
much-lauded efficiency of arbitration will be degraded if the parties are unable to review
and digest relevant evidence prior to the arbitration hearing."); Koch Fuel Int'l v. M/V S.
Star, 118 F.R.D. 318, 321 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]he Court should not blindfold the arbitra-
tors and frustrate, perhaps irreparably, the fact-finding process . . . ."). As the court in
Meadows Indemnity noted, the arbitrators are better able to ascertain when discovery is rele-
vant to the dispute. 157 F.R.D. at 44; see supra note 180.
187 Indeed, the scheme would enable courts to deny enforcement of discovery subpoe-
nas in cases like Comsat, 190 F.3d 269, without holding that pre-hearing non-party discovery
is never available under § 7. A court could resolve the Comsat scenario under this scheme
simply by holding that Comsat had a reasonable alternative source of the information
sought, and thus that the subpoena was overly burdensome. See supra note 73 and accom-
panying text (discussing the alternate availability of the requested information through
FOIA requests).
188 See Sec. Life Ins., 228 F.3d at 871 ("Transamerica further contends that § 7 required
the district court to make an independent assessment of the materiality of the information
sought by Security .... We disagree .... [W]e believe it is antithetical to the well-recog-
nized federal policy favoring arbitration, and compromises the panel's presumed expertise
in the matter at hand.").
189 See, e.g., supra notes 4-5.
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ties who oppose a particular discovery request will act as surrogates
who can assert the rights of non-parties to be free from unjust intru-
sion. Indeed, parties to an arbitration will often have an interest in
challenging discovery requests because discovery directly affects the
speed of an arbitration, and can reduce its overall efficiency. Thus, to
give meaning to the policy concerns underlying the FAA, the arbitra-
tor's legitimate evaluation of internal matters, such as the relevance
and the substantive necessity of discovery sought in a particular dis-
pute, should be final, but the court should have the last word on mat-
ters outside the scope of the dispute to be resolved.
CONCLUSION
The scope of arbitral subpoena power under § 7 is not easily as-
certained. The statute itself is unclear, and courts have not agreed on
its precise meaning. This Note suggests a new construction of the stat-
ute that is as of yet untested and unproven. As the outer bounds of
arbitration practice continue to expand, new situations will arise that
will further obscure this issue. Moreover, the growth of arbitration
over time will doubtless expose additional issues as to which the scope
of the FAA is unclear. However, one thing is clear: arbitration is
meant to offer parties increased efficiencies over traditional litigation,
and at the same time to ensure just results and encourage faith in the
competence of the system. These two goals are essential elements of
the arbitral forum, and the balance between them must always be pre-
served. Thus, as difficult issues arise, and easy answers elude us, it
becomes necessary to approach these issues with the self-conscious
purpose of preserving the balance between efficiency and competency
concerns. This crucial balance of sometimes divergent policy con-
cerns awaits discovery.
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